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TO DIE OR NOT TO DIE: THE NEW YORK
LEGISLATURE PONDERS A NATURAL DEATH
ACT
Like it or not, we are increasingly involved in life-and-death
questions to which we have no consistent response. Science is
leaving us in the dust.'
[Governor Mario Cuomo, New York, 1984]
I. Introduction
In December, 1984, New York's Governor Mario Cuomo appointed
a twenty-three member commission to recommend ways for the New
York State Legislature to respond to a vast range of issues concerning
medicine and morality.2 One of the major issues the commission
will examine is -the medical and legal implications arising from
doctors' withholding or withdrawing3 life-sustaining medical treat-
ment from terminally ill patients. 4 Hospitals and doctors recently
have urged the adoption of a statute which would allow them to
withhold or withdraw such life-saving treament with full immunity
from civil or criminal 'liability, "when [the] doctor agrees with the
patient or the patient's family that so-called 'heroic' measures would
only prolong needless suffering.''
1. Oreskes, Cuomo Plans Unit on 'Right to Die,' N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1984,
at AI, col. 1 (quoting Address by Governor Cuomo, St. Francis College in Brooklyn,
New York (Oct. 3, 1984)) [hereinafter cited as Oreskes]. At this address the Governor
announced the establishment of a task force to respond to a series of questions
involving medicine, morality and the law. Id.
2. Severo, Cuomo Appoints 23 to Study Issues in Medical Technology, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 23, 1984, at A22, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as SeveroJ. The commission
includes doctors, nurses, priests, rabbis,- lawyers and professors. Id. The chairman
of the commission is Dr. David Axelrod, the State Health Commissioner. Id.
3. An example of life-sustaining medical treatment which can be withheld is
cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Examples of life-sustaining medical treatment that
can be withdrawn are respiratory support and artificial feeding tubes.
4. Severo, supra note 2, at A22, col. 1; see also Sullivan, State Officials
Drafting a Bill on Withholding Life Support, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1984, at Al,
col. 1 (discussing Health Commissioner's intial decision to draft legislation) [here-
inafter cited as Sullivan). The commission will also examine other issues such as
abortion and the legal rights of embryos formed outside the womb. See Oreskes,
supra note 1, at Al, col. 1.
5. Sullivan, supra note 4, at Al, col. 1. Doctors and hospitals in New York
currently follow guidelines issued by the Medical Society of New York in' 1982
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Since the New Jersey Supreme Court settled the question of liability
for doctors who withdraw life-support systems from terminally ill
patients in In re Quinlan,6 six other state judiciaries have addressed
the issue. There are vast differences, however, in these state courts'
perceptions of the manner in which the decision to withdraw or
withhold life-saving measures should be made.7 Thirty-five states
and the District of Columbia have enacted "living will" statutes to
settle this decision-making issue since California enacted the first
such law in 1976.8 These statutes generally recognize a competent
patient's directive, or living will, which authorizes a doctor to with-
draw or withhold life-sustaining treatment if the patient becomes
terminally ill and frees doctors and hospitals complying with a legally
effective directive from all liability. 9 Although the New York State
Legislature has not acted on this matter, New York courts have
addressed the issue of withholding or withdrawing life support treat-
ment from a dying patient. 10
The withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining medical treat-
ment from terminally ill patients requires a balancing of several
competing and potentially conflicting interests. The state's interests
in compelling lifesaving medical treatment" must be weighed against
which outline the circumstances under which they can withhold life-prolonging
treatment. For a discussion of these guidelines, see infra notes 223-33 and accom-
panying text.
6. 70 N.J. 10, 54, 355 A.2d 647, 671, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)
(respirator systems may be withdrawn without any liability on part of any participant
when certain procedures are followed). For an in-depth discussion of Quinlan, see
infra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
7. The six other judiciaries are Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New York and Ohio. See infra notes 38-83, 179-219. Compare In re Spring, 380
Mass. 629, 636, 405 N.E.2d 115, 120 (1980) (ultimate decision-making responsibility
should not be taken away from probate court as to continuance or termination
of treatment) and Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 758-
59, 370 N.E.2d 417, 434-35 (1977) (decision to withdraw treatment is not to be.
entrusted to patient's guardian, family, doctors, or hospital ethics committee) with
Quinlan, infra notes 20-37 and accompanying text. See infra notes 45-49 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these differences.
8. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1984).
See infra notes 84-112 and accompanying text for a discussion of the California
statute, and infra notes 113-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the other
statutes.
9. See infra notes 84-178 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
statutes.
10. See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266,
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d
517 (2d Dep't 1980), modified sub nom. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d
64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). See infra notes 179-219 and accompanying text for
a discussion of these cases.
11. These interests include: (1) preventing suicide; (2) protecting incompetents;
(3) protecting the medical profession; (4) protecting minor children through the
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the patient's or the incompetent patient's family's constitutional right
to privacy in dying with dignity. 2 Further, the "doctors are asked
to balance odds of survival, fears of malpractice lawsuits, family
guilt and their own personal sense of ethics in .determining the care
of the dying."' 3
This Note first examines how states other than New York have
settled the question of withholding or withdrawing life-support treat-
ment from dying patients by judicial decision 4 or by statute. 5 The
Note then discusses recent New York decisions addressing this issue.1
6
Following a discussion of recent developments and legislative pro-
posals, 7 this Note recommends that the New York State Legislature
adopt a "living will" statute which enunciates the procedures to be
followed in withdrawing or withholding life-saving treatment from
terminally ill patients." In addressing this issue, the legislature should
state's role as parens patriae; and (5) protecting public health. See generally Byrn,
Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REV.
1, 16-35 (1975) (listing and describing the state's interests) [hereinafter cited as
Byrn].
12. The Supreme Court first recognized the right to privacy when it held that
married couples have a constitutional right to use contraceptives. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court extended its recognition of the right
to privacy when it protected a woman's right to have an abortion. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973). The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that this right to
privacy enunciated by the United States Supreme Court also included an individual's
right to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances. In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See generally
Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30
RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1977) (discussing Quinlan and constitutional right to privacy)
[hereinafter cited as Cantor]. This Note does not address the arguments for and
against the right to die. This Note assumes that such a right exists and eiamines
the various procedures that states have established for the exercise of that right.
13. Kleiman, Hospital Care of the Dying: Each Day, Painful Choices, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 14, 1985, at Al, col. 1; see also Byrn, supra note 11, at 29-33
(discussing medical profession's interest in protecting itself); Kleiman, Doctors Ask,
Who Lives? When to Die?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1985, at BI, col. 1 (discussing
questions confronting doctors when terminating or prolonging life). See generally
Greenbaum, Current Standards of Practice in Medicine: The Medical, Judicial, and
Legislative Roles, 7 W. ST. U.L. REV. 3, 13-23 (1979) (discussing decisions to
withhold and withdraw life-support systems) [hereinafter cited as Greenbaum].
14. See infra notes 20-83 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 84-178 and accompanying text. This Note will examine only
those statutes enacted prior to 1985. In 1985, thirteen of the thirty-five states enacted
statutes between the writing and publishing of this Note. See Otten, New 'Wills'
Allow People to Reject Prolonging of Life in Fatal Illness, Wall St. J., July 2, 1985,
at 35, col. 4 (states are Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Utah).
16. See infra notes 179-219 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 220-64 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 265-77 and accompanying text. This Note will not address
the issue of what constitutes death. Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia
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take special notice of and seek to remedy the inadequacies of existing
"living will" statutes so that current questions pertaining to artificial
feeding and decision-making for incompetent patients 19 are answered.
Only then will doctors and hospitals be fully protected from civil
and criminal liability resulting from the withholding or withdrawing
of life-sustaining medical treatment from terminally ill patients.
II. Judicial Development of the "Right to Die"
A. In re Quinlan
In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously ruled that
Joseph Quinlan could withdraw the respiratory life-support system
from his twenty-one-year-old comatose daughter, Karen Ann Quin-
lan, without fear of civil or criminal prosecution. 2 In deciding that
the respiratory life-support system could be removed, the supreme
court also held that the "said action shall be without any civil or
criminal liability .. .on the part of any participant, whether guard-
ian, physician, hospital, or others."'"
have used a brain-based criteria to define death. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE,
HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS 1981-1984, at 30 (1984) (states are Alabama,
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) [hereinafter cited as RIGHT
TO DIE HANDBOOK]. Although New York has no statute, the New York State Court
of Appeals recently recognized a brain-based criteria for determining death. People
v. Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d 341, 346, 472 N.E.2d 286, 288-89, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438-39
(1984). Recently, Governor Cuomo asked the commission to recommend legislation
that would define brain death. Sullivan, Cuomo Asks Panel for Brain Death
Proposal, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1985, § 1, at 44, col. 1.
19. See infra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
20. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
The superior court had refused to give Mr. Quinlan the authority to terminate the
life-support treatment of his incompetent daughter. In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super.
227, 348 A.2d 801 (Ch. Div. 1975).
21. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671. For a discussion of the question
of civil and criminal liability in withholding life-saving treatment from dying patients
which Quinlan presented, see Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A Prosecutorial
View of the Quinlan Case, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 304 (1977) (discussing issue of
civil and criminal liability in treatment of dying patients); Hirsch and Donovan,
The Right to Die: Medico-Legal Implication of In re Quinlan, 30 RUTGERS L. REV.
267, 270-73 (1977) (discussing removal of civil and criminal liability); Note, The
Right to Die a Natural Death: A Discussion of In re Quinlan and the California
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On April 15, 1975, for reasons that still remain uncertain, 22 Quinlan
stopped breathing and lapsed into a coma. 23 She was placed on a
respirator at Newton Memorial Hospital and later was transferred
to Saint Clare's Hospital. 24 Because her physicians refused to dis-
continue her life-support treatment for reasons of traditional medical
practice and ethics, 2 Quinlan's father initiated a suit in a state court
of equity for a decree permitting him, as appointed guardian of his
daughter, to discontinue the treatment. 26 The superior court denied
this relief, reasoning that the decision to remove the life-support
treatment was a medical not a legal matter. 27 The court stated that
the decision "may be concurred in by the parents but not governed
by them." ' 2 The court also stated that its refusal to grant the
authorization did not violate an incompetent's constitutional right
to privacy. 29 The court declared that "[t]here is no constitutional
Natural Death Act, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 192, 203-05 (1977) (discussing role of
physicians and hospitals in withholding life-saving treatment fully immune from
liability) [hereinafter cited as California Natural Death Act].
22. Urine and blood tests indicated the presence of quinine, aspirin, barbiturates
and traces of valium and librium. The drugs were found to be in the "therapeutic
range, and the quinine consistent with mixing in drinks like soda water." In re
Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. at 237, 348 A.2d at 806.
23. Id. at 237, 348 A.2d at 806-07. On the morning of April 16, 1975, Dr.
Morse examined Ms. Quinlan and "found her in a state of coma, with evidence
of decortication indicating altered level of consciousness." Id. at 237, 348 A.2d
at 807.
24. Id. at 237-38, 348 A.2d at 807. Ms. Quinlan was:
[Pilaced on a MA-i respirator, which provides air to her lungs on a
controlled volume basis. It also has a "sigh volume," which is a periodic
increase in the volume of air to purge the lungs of any accumulation
of fluids or excretions. The machine takes over completely the breathing
function when the patient does not breathe spontaneously.
Id. at 239, 348 A.2d at 807; see also Bellegie, Medical Technology As It Exists
Today, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 31, 32 (1975) (description of functioning of respirator).
25. Dr. Morse had "concluded that to terminate the respirator would be a
substantial deviation from medical tradition, that it involved ascertaining 'quality
of life,' and that he would not do so." Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. at 250, 348
A.2d at 814. Such refusals are usually based on the ethical standards stated by
the Hippocratic Oath. Note, In re Quinlan: Defining the Basis for Terminating
Life Support Under the Right of Privacy, 12 TULSA L.J. 150, 153 n.14 (1976).
26. Mr. Quinlan asserted that his daughter and her family "have by virtue of
the constitutional right of privacy a right of self-determination which extends to
the decision to terminate 'futile use of extraordinary measures.' " Id. at 251, 348
A.2d at 814. In essence, Mr. Quinlan sought to relieve his daughter from any
further suffering.
27. Id. at 260, 348 A.2d at 819.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 265, 348 A.2d at 822.
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right to die that can be asserted by a parent for his incompetent
adult child." 30
In reviewing the lower court's conclusion,3 the New Jersey Supreme
Court overcame the threshold consideration of Quinlan's obvious
inability to make a decision about her future medical care32 by
deciding to allow her parents to make the choice for her.33 However,
Chief Justice Hughes stated that this judicial authorization of parental
power would be allowed only when the hospital's "ethics committee"
and the patient's attending physicians concluded that there was no
hope of recovery.34
In its analysis, the supreme court examined a patient's right to
privacy in making decisions concerning medical treatment and con-
cluded that it is "broad enough to encompass a patient's decision
to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances." 35 The
court also held that Quinlan's right to privacy outweighed the State's
interest in protecting her life. 6 In reversing the lower court, the
30. Id. at 266, 348 A.2d at 822.
31. Mr Quinlan appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, but prior
to a hearing before the intermediate appellate court, the case was directly certified
to the New Jersey Supreme Court. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 18, 355 A.2d 647,
651 (1976).
32. Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663. For a discussion of the living will and its effect
on treatment decisions for the incompetent patient, see infra notes 161-63 and
accompanying text.
33. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664. The court concluded "that
Karen's right of privacy may be asserted on her behalf by her guardian [her father]
." Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
34. Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671. Chief Justice Hughes also noted that "such a
system would be protective to the hospital as well as the doctor in screening out,
so to speak, a case which might be contaminated by less than worthy motivations
of family or physician." Id. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669. For a discussion of this
concept of an "ethics committee," see Teel, The Physician's Dilemma A Doctor's
View: What the Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 6 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Teel].
In her discussion of the "ethics committee" Dr. Teel states:
Many hospitals have established an Ethics Committee composed of phy-
sicians, social workers, attorneys, and theologians, . . . which serves to
review the individual circumstances of ethical dilemma and which has
provided much in the way of assistance and safeguards for patients and
their medical caretakers. Generally, the authority of these, committees is
primarily restricted to the hospital setting and their official status is more
that of an advisory body than of an enforcing body.
Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668 (quoting Teel, supra, at 8-9).
35. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. For a discussion of this issue,
see Cantor, supra note 12, at 243.
36. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40-41, 355 A.2d at 663-64. Here the court paid special
attention to Ms. Quinlan's prognosis, which was extremely poor. Ms. Quinlan
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New Jersey Supreme Court recognized a need for reform in the law
regarding the withholding of life-saving treatment from terminally
ill patients.3"
B. Post-Quinlan Judicial Development
The New Jersey landmark decision in In re Quinlan38 was the
predecessor of other state court decisions concerning liability in
support withdrawal cases.3 9 One year after Quinlan, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, in Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz,4° permitted the appointed guardian ad litem 4'
of Joseph Saikewicz, a sixty-seven-year-old retarded man suffering
from leukemia, 42 to discontinue his ward's chemotherapy treatments.4 3
Like the Quinlan court, the unanimous Saikewicz court "recognize[d]
a general right in all persons to refuse medical treatment in appro-
would never resume cognitive life and was described as "emaciated, having suffered
a weight loss of at least 40 pounds, and undergoing a continuing deteriorative
process." Id. at 26, 355 A.2d at 655. For a discussion of the State's interest in
ordering life-saving treatment, see Byrn, supra note 11, at 16-35.
37. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 42-51, 355 A.2d at 664-69. Medical standards and
practices of the attending physician are not binding on the court in responding to
the decision to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment from terminally ill patients.
Id. at 51, 355 A.2d at 669.
38. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See supra
notes 20-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
39. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 40-83 and accompanying
text. See also Note, The Right to Die a Natural Death and the Living Will, 13
TEx. TECH L. REv. 99, 104-10 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Right to Die a Natural
Death]. See infra notes 179-219 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
New York cases.
40. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). After appointing a guardian ad
litem, the probate judge agreed that discontinuing the resident patient's treatment
would be in the patient's best interest. Questions concerning the decision were
reported to the appellate court. The case reached the Supreme Judicial Court when
it granted a request for direct review. Id. at 729-30, 370 N.E.2d at 419. See infra
note 41 for a definition of guardian ad litem.
41. A guardian ad litem is a "special guardian appointed by the court to
prosecute or defend, in behalf of an infant or incompetent, a suit to which he is
a party, and such guardian is considered an officer of the court to represent the
interests of the infant or incompetent in the litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
635 (5th ed. 1979).
42. Id. at 731-32, 370 N.E.2d 420. Leukemia is a disease of the blood which
results when the body produces an excessive amount of white blood cells and other
abnormal cellular stuctures. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 777 (24th ed.
1982) [hereinafter MEDICAL DICTIONARY]. The disease causes "internal bleeding and
weakness, and, in the acute form, severe anemia and high susceptability to infection."
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 732, 370 N.E.2d at 420.
43. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
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priate circumstances. The recognition of that right must extend to
the case of an incompetent, as well as a competent, patient-because
the value of human dignity extends to both." 44
The Saikewicz court, in applying a different analysis than Quinlan,
further ruled that the decision to terminate the life-sustaining treat-
ment of an incompetent individual was one for the courts alone to
make. 45 Thus, the court would make a "substituted judgment" based
on all available evidence as to the treatment the incompetent patient
would have chosen. 46 Here, the court determined that this patient,
if competent, would have terminated treatment based on evidence
of the probable side effects of the treatment, the slight chance of
remission, the patient's suffering, and the patient's inability to co-
operate with the treatment. 47 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in
Quinlan, had entrusted this decision to the patient's guardian, family,
attending doctors, and hospital "ethics committee." ' 4 In Saikewicz,
Justice Liacos, writing for the unanimous court, rejected this ap-
proach, stating:
[S]uch questions of life and death seem to us to require the
process of detached but passionate investigation and decision that
forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of the government
was created. Achieving this ideal is our responsibility and that
of the lower court, and is not to be entrusted to any other group
44. Id. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at 427; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d
647, 663; see also In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 634, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119 (1980)
(prognosis and magnitude of proposed invasion of bodily integrity are to be taken
into account when determining appropriate circumstances for discontinuing treat-
ment); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 474-75, 380 N.E.2d 134, 138-39
(1978) (appropriate circumstances for treatment refusal include fact that elderly
hospital patient was in vegetative state and was irreversibly and terminally ill).
45. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 755-59, 370 N.E.2d at 432-35.
46. Id. at 750-52, 370 N.E.2d at 430-31. The court stated:
ITlhe decision in cases such as this should be that which would be made
by the incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking
into account the present and future incompetency of the individual as
one of the factors which would necessarily enter into the decision-making
process of the competent person.
Id. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
47. Id. at 753-55, 370 N.E.2d at 432.
48. Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 54, 355 A.2d 647, 671; see supra notes 31-34 and
accompanying text. In its conclusion, the Quinlan court also stated that "we do
not intend to be understood as implying that a proceeding for judicial declaratory
relief is necessarily required for the implementation of comparable decisions in the
field of medical practice." Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 55, 355 A.2d at 672.
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purporting to represent the "morality and conscience of our so-
ciety," no matter how highly motivated or impressively consti-
tuted .9
The Saikewicz judicial determination rationale for the withholding
or withdrawing of life-saving treatment from an incompetent patient
has been adopted by other jurisdictions. 0 For example, the Delaware
Supreme Court, in Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.,"
found that the husband-guardian of a comatose patient with irre-
versible brain damage 2 could seek court relief to discontinue her
life-sustaining medical treatment. 3 Unlike the court in Quinlan, how-
ever, the Severns court concluded that a full evidentiary hearing
must be held by the lower court to decide whether the relief requested
was appropriate. 4 Moreover, in contrast to the Saikewicz court, the
Severns court explicitly recognized the need for a "living will"
statute,5 which the Delaware General Assembly has since enacted. 6
State courts in Florida,57 Minnesota, 8 New York 9 and Ohio60 have
49. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435; see also In re Spring, 380
Mass. 629, 636, 405 N.E.2d 115, 120 (court affirmed Saikewicz and held that
decision-making responsibility properly belongs to courts). This approach, however,
does not give any guidelines as to future cases. A comprehensive "living will"
statute, on the other hand, would remedy this situation. See infra notes 265-77
and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1349-
50 (Del. 1980) (evidentiary hearing required in request to remove life-sustaining
treatment); Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 11, 426
N.E.2d 809, 815 (C.P. 1980) (judicial standard of "clear and convincing" proof
of patient's desire to refuse treatment required before treatment can be withheld).
51. 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980)
52. Id. at 1336-37. Mrs. Severns suffered her injury in a one-car accident. The
severe damage to her brain had significantly impaired its functioning. Id.
53. Id. at 1347.
54. Id. at 1349-50. The high court answered the lower court's certified question
responding that "the Court of Chancery shall make specific findings of fact before
determining what relief is appropriate based on such findings." Id. at 1350.
55. Id. at 1346. For a discussion of Saikewicz, see supra notes 40-49 and
accompanying text.
56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2508 (1983). For a discussion of this and
other "living will" statutes, see infra notes 84-178 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921
(Fla. 1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980). For a discussion of
Satz, see infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984). For a discussion of
Torres, see infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 378-80, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71-72, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 274 (1981). For a discussion of Storar and other New York cases,
see infra notes 179-219 and accompanying text.
60. Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 12-13, 426 N.E.2d
809, 815-16 (C.P. 1980).
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authorized the withdrawal of life-support systems from terminally
ill patients. In Satz v. Perlmutter,61 the Florida Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's ruling that a seventy-three-year-old com-
petent, terminally ill patient 62 could authorize a doctor to discontinue
his extraordinary medical treatment. 63 The Florida Supreme Court,
unanimously affirming 64 one year after the patient's death, refused
to establish guidelines for future cases. 65 However, it recognized the
need for legislative intervention 66 just as the Delaware Supreme Court
had in Severns.6 7
In November, 1984, the Minnesota Supreme Court allowed the
conservator of a comatose patient with irreversible brain damage to
order removal of the patient's respirator in In re Torres.61 As in
Quinlan, the court recognized the individual's right to "order the
disconnection of extraordinary life support systems." ' 69 Like the Del-
aware and Florida high courts, Justice Todd, author of the majority
decision, recognizing a court's inability to handle this entire issue,
stated: "[tihis case has presented the court with an opportunity to
consider a number of issues of great societal concern. We have
declined to do so at this time, however, since we believe the legislative
process would be a superior method of insuring public input into
such vital questions." ' 70 The court held that, under the facts, a court
61. 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla.1980).
62. Satz, 362 So. 2d at 161. Abe Perlmutter suffered from amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis, commonly known as Lou Gehrig's disease, of which there is no known
cure. See MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 42, at 1264. Life expectancy for inflicted
patients is about two years. Satz, 362 So. 2d at 161.
63. Id. at 164. The court decided that the patient's respirator device could be
removed stating that Mr. Perlmutter "should be allowed to make his choice to
die with dignity." Id.
64. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
65. Id. at 360-61.
66. Id. The Florida Legislature has recently enacted the Life Prolonging Pro-
cedure Act which became effective on October 1, 1984. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-
.15 (Supp. 1985). See infra notes 84-178 and accompanying text for a general
discussion of "living will" statutes. See also John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v.
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926-27 (Fla. 1984) (life-support system of terminally
ill, comatose patient who executed "living" will can be withdrawn without fear
of civil or criminal liability without court approval).
67. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
68. In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984). Mr. Torres had been comatose
and dependent on the respirator for about eight months. Mr. Torres suffered
irreversible brain damage as the result of an accident in his hospital room. Id. at
333-34.
69. Id. at 339. For a discussion of the Quinlan case, see supra notes 20-37 and
accompanying text.
70. Id. at 341. See supra notes 51-56 for a discussion of the Severns case and
notes 61-67 for a discussion of the Satz case.
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order was necessary" since the patient had no immediate family that
could be consulted.72 Where a comatose patient did have an immediate
family, however, the majority, in dictum, stated that a court order
would not be necessary.73
Although these state courts have decided to adjudicate the question
of withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatment from ter-
minally ill patients, 74 they have declined to issue guidelines as to
future cases. For example, the question of whether artificial or tube-
feeding is extraordinary medical treatment within the meaning of
the Quinlan decision 75 has not been answered in most of these
juridictions.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, recently decided that
artificial feeding could be withdrawn from a terminally ill patient
pursuant to the Quinlan decision. 76 In re Conroy involved an eighty-
four-year-old nursing home patient who was mentally incompetent
and terminally ill.17 The appellate division refused to grant the director
71. Torres, 357 N.W.2d at 341.
72. The court noted that "[u]nlike Karen Quinlan, Rudolfo Torres has no
immediate family." Id. at 337.
73. Justice Todd stated that a court order would not be necessary in situations
where there is "consultation between the attending doctor and the family with the
approval of the hospital ethics committee." Id. at 341 n.4. Three justices concurred
in the majority opinion but felt "that in all cases when the decision of continued
life or likely death is involved there should be a court procedure ...... Id. at
341 (Kelly, J., concurring specially); see also id. (Peterson, J., concurring specially)
("[a] requirement of judicial oversight is a basic recognition of the state's undoubted
interest in the safety of its citizens"). See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Saikewicz case.
74. See supra notes 20-73 and accompanying text.
75. In Quinlan, Ms. Quinlan's father sought to have only her respirator removed.
Ms. Quinlan has continued to live in a vegetative state after the respirator was
disconnected. See Norman, Our Towns: The Quinlans and the Lastest Right-to-
Die Ruling, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1985, at B4, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Norman].
See supra notes 20-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of In re Quinlan.
76. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 374, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236-37 (1985); see also
Barber v. Superior Court of California, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484, 490 (1983) (withdrawal of feeding tubes is no different from withdrawal
of respirator).
77. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 335, 486 A.2d at 1216. The trial court found that Ms.
Conroy had become incompetent, that her life had become "impossibly and per-
manently burdensome," and that the removal of the feeding tube should therefore
be allowed. 188 N.J. Super. 523, 529, 457 A.2d 1232, 1236 (Ch. Div. 1983).
Although Ms. Conroy died with the nasogastric tube still intact, the appellate
division reversed and concluded that the withdrawal of the feeding tube was the
kind of active euthanasia that ethically was impermissible and would therefore set
a dangerous precedent. 190 N.J. Super. 453, 475-76, 464 A.2d 303, 315 (App. Div.
1983).
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of the nursing home authority to withdraw this equipment.7" The
supreme court reversed and refused to draw a distinction between
an artificial feeding tube and a respirator in decisions involving the
withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment.7 9 The court also
established special guidelines to be followed before withdrawing
medical treatment from nursing home patients. First, the nursing
home would have to notify an ombudsman to protect the patient's
interests.8 0 Second, at least two outside physicians would have to
concur in a decision to withhold or withdraw treatment.' The com-
plexities of the problems presented in In re Conroy led Justice
Schreiber, writing for the majority," to comment that:
Perhaps it would be best if the Legislature formulated clear
standards for resolving requests to terminate life-sustaining treat-
ment for incompetent patients. As an elected body, the Legislature
is better able than any other single institution to reflect the social
values at stake. In addition, it has the resources and ability to
synthesize vast quantities of data and opinions from a variety of
fields and to formulate general guidelines that may be applicable
to a broad range of situations. 3
III. Natural Death and Living Will Legislation
A. The California Natural Death Act
In 1976, several months after the New Jersey Supreme Court's
78. 190 N.J. Super. at 476, 464 A.2d at 315.
79. 98 N.J. at 372-74, 486 A.2d at 1235-37; see also Sullivan,' 'Right to Die'
Rule in Terminal Cases Widened in Jersey, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1985, at Al,
col. 1. It is interesting to note that the Quinlans have decided not to remove their
daughter's feeding tubes. See Norman, supra note 75, at B4, col. 4. It might be
argued that by allowing the removal of feeding tubes a court might next permit
the withholding of oral feeding. However, a nasogastric tube is quite different
from feeding a patient with a spoon. See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 373, 486 A.2d at
1236 ("[njasogastric tubes may lead to pneumonia, cause irritation and discomfort,
and require arm restraints for an incompetent patient").
80. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 383-84, 486 A.2d at 1241-42. For a discussion of how
the California Natural Death Act's provides for the protection of terminally ill
nursing home patients, see infra note 102 and accompanying text.
81. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 384-85, 486 A.2d at 1242-43.
82. In dissent, Justice Handler noted that other life-and-death issues beyond
pain and suffering should be considered. Id. at 388-99, 486 A.2d at 1244-50 (these
issues include "all concerns and values that have a legitimate bearing on the decision
whether to provide particular treatment at the very end of an individual's life").
83. Id. at 344, 486 A.2d at 1220-21 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. XIII650
NATURAL DEATH ACT
In re Quinlan14 decision, California became the first state to legislate
rules and procedures governing the withholding or withdrawal of
life-saving medical treatment. 5 The Natural Death Act created a
procedure whereby a competent patient could direct his doctors,
under certain conditions, to withhold life-saving treatment without
resort to the courts.16 The California Legislature was motivated
primarily by its recognition of the "uncertainty in the medical and
legal professions as to the legality of terminating the use or appli-
cation of life-sustaining procedures where the patient has voluntarily
and in sound mind evidenced a desire that such procedures be
withheld or withdrawn." 87
Of six definitions, which apply throughout the California statute8
the three most important defined terms are "life-sustaining proce-
dure," 9 "qualified patient," 9 and "terminal condition." 9 The terms,
as defined, determine the scope of the statute's application. Thus,
the statute focuses on the competent "qualified patient's" right to
execute a directive 92 which orders the withholding or withdrawing
of "life-sustaining procedures" when the patient is in a "terminal
condition." 93
84. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). For a discussion
of this case, see supra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
85. Natural Death Act, ch, 1439, 1976 Cal. Stat. 6478 (codified at CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1984)). See generally The Right to Die
d Natural Death, supra note 39, at 111-14 (describing California Natural Death
Act); California Natural Death Act, supra note 21 (discussing Quinlan and California
Natural Death Act).
86. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1984) ("[any adult person
may execute a directive directing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
procedures in a terminal condition").
87. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186 (West Supp. 1984). The statute applies
both to the withholding and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. Id. See
supra note 3 for examples of the types of medical treatments that might be withheld
or withdrawn.
88. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187 (West Supp. 1984).
89. Id. § 7187(c) (West Supp. 1984) ("'[1]ife-sustaining procedure' means any
medical procedur [sic] or intervention which utilizes mechanical or other artificial
means to sustain, restore, or supplant a vital function, which ... would serve
only to artificially prolong the moment of death . . .").
90. Id. § 7187(e) (West Supp. 1984) (.'[q]ualified patient' means a patient
diagnosed and certified in writing to be afflicted with a terminal condition by two
physicians . . . ").
91. Id. § 7187(f) (West Supp. 1984) ("'[t]erminal condition' means an incurable
condition caused by injury, disease, or illness, which, regardless of the application
of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable medical judgment, produce
death . . . ").
92. These directives are known as "living wills." See supra note 9 and accom-
panying text.
93. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1984).
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Under the California statute, the written directive stays effective
for five years from the date of execution 94 and may be revoked at
any time by the declarant. 9 The directive must be made in the
presence of two witnesses who may not be: (1) a relative of the
declarant; (2) the attending physician or an employee of the health
facility in which the declarant is a patient; or (3) any person with
a claim in the declarant's estate. 96 The attending physician will
act pursuant to the directive only if "the declarant was a qual-
ified patient at least 14 days prior to executing or reexecuting the
directive . . .,97
The statute also addresses the vital question of doctor-hospital
liability in withdrawing life-sustaining treatment pursuant to such a
directive. It grants immunity from civil and criminal liability for
those health professionals who properly observe the terms of an
executed directive. 98 One section of the statute also provides a stand-
ard form, entitled "Directive to Physicians," 99 which includes pro-
visions that: (1) invalidate the directive during pregnancy; (2) create
the effective period of five years; and (3) require the patient to be
competent at the time of its execution.' °° The statute also insures
that a patient who dies after the withholding of life-saving treatment
in compliance with the statute not be considered a suicide.' 0' If the
individual making the directive is a patient in a skilled nursing home,
additional formalities are required. 0 2 The statute also provides crim-
94. Id. § 7189.5 (West Supp. 1984). Nothing in this section should "be construed
to prevent a declarant from reeXecuting a directive at any time in accordance with
the formalities of Section 7188 ...... Id. The directive must in writing and signed
by the declarant. Id. § 7188 (West Supp. 1984).
95. Id. § 7189 (West Supp. 1984). The living will can be revoked in writing,
verbally, or by destroying the patient's directive at his direction and in his presence.
Id.
96. Id. § 7188 (West Supp. 1984).
97. Id. § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1984). The California statute specifically provides
that it Will not hold liable any physician or health facility for failing to effectuate
the directive of a "qualified patient." Such action will, however, constitute un-
professional conduct. Id.
98. Id. § 7190 (West Supp. 1984).
99. Id. § 7188 (West Supp. 1984).
100. Id.
101. Id. § 7192(a) (West Supp. 1984). The statute provides that "[tihe withholding
or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a qualified patient in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide."
Id.
102. One of the two witnesses to the directive of a nursing home resident must
be a patient advocate or an ombudsman as designated by the State Department
of Aging. Id. § 7188.5 (West Supp. 1984). The legislature commented:
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inal sanctions for the wrongful tampering with the formation or
revocation of a directive. 03 Finally, the statute concludes by stating
that it does not approve of "mercy killings" under any circum-
stances. 104
The California Natural Death Act, the first of its kind, recognized
the validity of a competent, terminally ill individual's right to ter-
minate life-sustaining medical treatment. 105 The Act also gives full
immunity to all doctors and hospitals complying with this statute
in the termination of life-support treatment. 10 6 However, the statute
does not provide a procedure for terminating treatment in the case
of incompetent terminally ill patients. 10 7 In fact, a California court
recently decided that if the patient is incompetent and has not
executed an advance declaration the statute has no application. 08
In addition, the fourteen day waiting period'0 9 and the five year
effective period"0 are too restrictive since the patient could become
incompetent after being diagnosed as terminally ill and before ex-
ecuting or reexecuting the directive and since it is more sensible to
allow an executed directive to remain valid unless and until a person
chooses to revoke it."' Additionally, the California statute does not
The intent of this section is to recognize that some patients in skilled
nursing facilities may be so insulated from a voluntary decisionmaking
role, by virtue of the custodial nature of their care, as to require special
assurance that they are capable of willfully and voluntarily executing a
directive.
Id. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of this special
problem in the Conroy decision.
103. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7194 (West Supp. 1984). Tampering with
a directive will result in a misdemeanor. Tampering with a directive or a revocation
which results in the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures contrary
to the declarant's wishes will be subject to prosecution for unlawful homicide. Id.
104. Id. § 7195 (West Supp. 1984) ("[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed
to condone, authorize, or approve mercy killing, or to permit any affirmative or
deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the natural process of
dying as provided in this chapter").
105. See supra notes 85-104 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
107. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1984).
108. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court of California, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006,
1018, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (1983) (Natural Death Act does not provide procedure
for withholding of treatment from incompetent patients). See infra notes 161-63
and accompanying text for discussion of a procedure for withholding treatment
from incompetent patients.
109. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 275-77 and accompanying text. One reason in favor of the
fourteen day waiting period might be to allow the patient time to "cool off" after
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specify whether artificial or tube-feeding comes under its definition
of "life-sustaining procedure.' 1 1 2
B. Post-1976 Statutory Development
Although California was the first state to address the question of
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment from
terminally ill, competent patients legislatively, its Natural Death Act
is not as comprehensive as some of the subsequent "living will"
statutes of other states. '13 Thirty-five states, including California
and the District of Columbia, have enacted "living will" statutes
to settle the legal controversy over potential civil and criminal liability
for withholding life-saving treatment from terminally ill patients.'1 4
Although no two are alike in every respect,1" several basic provisions
are found in most of the statutes. For example, all of these statutes
diagnosis of a terminal illness. The legislature might have desired to prevent patients
from making hasty directives after the initial shock of a terminal illness diagnosis.
One reason in favor of the five-year effective period might be to provide for an
automatic revocation for those patients who might forget about the directive, i.e.
elderly patients.
112. The California Court of Appeals for the second district recently decided
that for the purpose of enforcing the Natural Death Act, there is no legal difference
between the withdrawal of feeding tubes from a patient and the withdrawal of a
respirator. See Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490
(1983). For a discussion of the New Jersey case, In re Conroy, and its decision
concerning removal of artificial feeding tubes, see supra notes 76-83 and accom-
panying text.
113. For a discussion of these other statutes, see infra notes 114-78 and accom-
panying text.
114. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -
3804 (Supp. 1983); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1984);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -
2430 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-.15 (Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 31-32-1 to -12 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (Supp. 1984);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, §§ 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 101 to 109 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1
to .10 (West Supp. 1985); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1984);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540-.690 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1981
& Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to 322 (1981 & Supp. 1983); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1983); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(h) (Vernon
Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262, tit. 13, § 1801 (Supp. 1984-
1985); VA. CODE §§ 54-325.8:1 to :13 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
70.122.010 to .905 (West Supp. 1984-1985); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (Supp.
1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West Supp. 1984-1985); Wyo. STAT. §§ 33-
26-144 to -152 (Supp. 1984). In 1985, thirteen of the thirty-five states enacted living
will legislation after the writing of this Note. See Otten, supra note 15.
115. For a comparison of the statutes, see infra notes 116-78 and accompanying
text. See also RIGHT TO DIE HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 31-34.
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recognize the validity of the "living will,"16 or directive, and grant
civil and criminal immunity to health professionals who properly
comply with the statute." 7 The laws also define terms used throughout
the statute,"' and twenty of them contain a standard form for the
declaration which must be followed exactly"19 or substantially.120
116. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3802 (Supp. 1983);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 2503 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2422 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.04
(Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504
(Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 703 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 103(a) (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.3(A)
(West Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-107 (Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 449.600 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-3 (1981 & Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-321(c) (1981 & Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.055 (1983); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(h), § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 5253 (Supp. 1984-1985); VA. CODE § 54-325.8:3 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.122.030 (West Supp. 1984-1985); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3 (Supp.
1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.03 (West Supp. 1984-1985); Wyo. STAT. § 33-26-
145 (Supp. 1984).
117. ALA. CODE § 22w8A-7 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3804 (Supp. 1983);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 2505 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2427(a) (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.10 (Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-7 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE §
39-4507 (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 707 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-
1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 106 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.8
(West Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-117 (Supp. 1984); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 449.630 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-7 (1981 & Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-321(h) (1981 & Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.065(3) (1983); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(h), § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 5259 (Supp. 1984-1985); VA. CODE § 54-325.8:8 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.122.050 (West Supp. 1984-1985); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-7(a) (Supp.
1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.07 (West Supp. 1984-1985); Wyo. STAT. § 33-26-
149 (Supp. 1984).
118. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-3 (1984); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187 (West
Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2501 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2421
(Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03 (Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-
2 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 39-4503 (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/
2, § 702 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 102 (1980);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.2 (West Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-
41-103 (Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540-.590 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-7-2 (1981 & Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(a) (1981 & Supp. 1983);
OR. REV. STAT. § 97.050 (1983); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(h), § 2
(Vernon Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5252 (Supp. 1984-1985); VA. CODE
§ 54-325.8:2 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.020 (West Supp. 1984-
1985); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-2 (Supp. 1984); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.01 (West
Supp. 1984-1985); Wyo. STAT. § 33-26-144 (Supp. 1984). The Arkansas statute does
not have a definition provision.
119. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 31-32-3 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. §
97.055 (1983); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(h), § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
120. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(c) (1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2422(c) (Supp. 1984);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.05 (Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 703(e)
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1. The Early Statutes
From 1977 to 1980, nine states followed California's example and
enacted "living will" laws.12' One of these laws, which closely re-
sembles the California statute in structure and format, is the Texas
Natural Death Act. 2 Like the California law, the Texas statute: (1)
recognizes the individual's right to refuse medical treatment with an
executed directive if he is in a terminal condition;2 3 (2) invalidates
the directive during pregnancy;2 4 (3) grants immunity from civil and
criminal liability to all health professionals who act without negligence
in accordance with the statute; 21 (4) provides a standard form di-
rective entitled "Directive to Physicians" which must be followed
exactly; 12 6 and (5) requires that the patient be diagnosed as terminally
ill before a living will will be enforced.2 7 There are two major
differences between the statutes, however. First, Texas rejected Cal-
ifornia's five year limitation on the duration of a directive in favor
of an amendment which states that the patient's directive will remain
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 103(c) (1980); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.3(C)(1) (West Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-
107(1) (Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.610 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
321(d) (1981 & Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5253 (Supp. 1984-1985);
VA. CODE § 54-325.8:4 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030 (West
Supp. 1984-1985); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3(d) (Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
154.01(2) (West Supp. 1984-1985); Wvo. STAT. § 33-26-145(d) (Supp. 1984). For
an extensive list of these basic provisions, see RIGHT TO DIE HANDBOOK, supra
note 18, at 12-13.
121. Arkansas, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, and Texas
enacted their statutes in 1977. Death with Dignity Act, ch. 879, 1977 Ark. Acts
2236; Natural Death Act, ch. 106, 1977 Idaho Sess. Laws 228; Withholding or
Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, ch. 393, 1977 Nev. Stat. 759; Right
to Die Act, ch. 287, 1977 N.M. Laws 2236; Right to Natural Death Act, ch. 815,
1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1101; Rights with Respect to Terminal Illness Act, ch. 183,
1977 Or. Laws 113; Natural Death Act, ch. 398, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 1085. Kansas
and Washington enacted their statutes in 1979. Natural Death Act, ch. 199, 1979
Kan. Sess. Laws 970; Natural Death Act, ch. 112, 1979 Wash. Laws 433. See
supra note 114 for citations to these statutes.
122. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(h) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
123. Id. § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1984). The Texas statute is slightly different from
the California statute concerning doctor-hospital liability. The doctors and hospitals
are granted full immunity "unless negligent." Id. However, the statute does not
define what it means by being negligent. See id. The California statute makes no
mention of negligence. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190 (West Supp.
1984).
126. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(h), § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
127. Id. § 7(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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effective until revocation.'28 The Texas statute also eliminated the
requirement of a fourteen day waiting period after diagnosis of a
terminal illness before an executed directive is considered valid and
operative. 129
The New Mexico Right to Die Act, which was enacted in 1977,130
differs greatly from the California statute. Though notable for its
conciseness, the New Mexico statute is more comprehensive than
the California and Texas laws because it permits the withholding
or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment from a patient who has
lapsed into an irreversible coma and who has not executed an advance
declaration' as well as from a patient in a terminal condition who
has executed a directive.'
The statute also provides short definitions for such terms as
"maintenance medical treatment"' 33 and "terminal illness."1 34 Unlike
the California law, however, the New Mexico Right to Die Act does
not provide a standard form directive and does not invalidate a
directive executed during pregnancy. 13 The New Mexico statute does
128. Id. § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1984). The statute provides that "[a] directive shall
be effective until it is revoked in a manner prescribed in Section 4 of this Act."
Id. In contrast, California's statute requires re-execution every five years. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189.5 (West Supp. 1984).
129. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(h), § 7(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984); cf.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1984) (requiring fourteen-day
waiting period). For further comparison, see RIGHT TO DIE HANDBOOK, supra note
18, at 31-34.
130. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1981 & Supp. 1984); see supra note
121.
131. Id. § 24-7-8.1 (Supp. 1984). If this situation exists, "a physician may remove
maintenance medical treatment from that person when all family members who
can be contacted through reasonable diligence agree in good faith that the patient,
if competent, would choose to forego that treatment." Id. Six other states also
have a provision to deal with incompetent patients who have no directive: Arkansas,
Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, Oregon, and Virginia. See ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 82-3803 (Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.07 (Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299.58.5 (West Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (1981 & Supp.
1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.083(l)-(3) (1983); VA. CODE § 54-325.8:6 (Supp. 1984).
132. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-3 (Supp. 1984).
133. The statute provides: "'maintenance medical treatment' means medical treat-
ment designed solely to sustain the life processes . . . ." Id. § 24-7-2(C) (Supp.
1984). For the California statute's definition of "life-sustaining procedure," see
supra note 89.
134. The statute provides: 'terminal illness' means an illness that will result in
death . . ., regardless of the use or discontinuance of maintenance medical treat-
ment." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-2(F) (Supp. 1984). For the California statute's
definition of "terminal condition," see supra note 91.
135. See id. § 24-7-3 (Supp. 1984). The California statute does provide a standard
form directive which also invalidates the directive during pregnancy. See supra notes
99-100 and accompanying text.
19851
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
contain a provision that establishes health professionals' immunity
from civil and criminal liability where they act on a directive executed
under this statute. 3 6 Like the Texas statute, there is an exception
from immunity because of the doctor's or hospital's negligence.,
3 7
However, the statute also states that doctors and hospitals acting
pursuant to the law are "presumed to be acting in good faith."'3
The seven other states which enacted "living will" statutes before
1980 are Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon
and Washington. 3 9 Like the California and Texas statutes, the Idaho
Natural Death Act requires a terminal illness determination before
execution of a directive. 40 Like the New Mexico statute, the Ar-
kansas, North Carolina and Oregon laws contain provisions that
permit the termination of life-sustaining treatment under certain
circumstances for incompetent patients who have no advance direc-
tive.' 4' The Washington Natural Death Act, however, does not con-
tain such a provision.142 Noting this omission, the Washington Supreme
Court recently provided guidelines for the withdrawing of medical
treatment from incompetent patients who have not executed a di-
rective under the "living will" law. 43 The court also wisely observed
that:
136. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-7 (Supp. 1984).
137. Id. For a discussion of the Texas statute's provision on doctor-hospital
immunity from liability, see supra note 125 and accompanying text.
138. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-7(A) (Supp. 1984).
139. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-
4501 to -4508 (Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 101 to 109 (1980); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 449.540-.690 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to 322 (1981 &
Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
70.122.010 to .905 (West Supp. 1984-1985). For dates of enactment, see supra note
121.
140. The statute does not address a declaration executed before diagnosis of a
terminal condition. See IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (Supp. 1984).
141. See ARK. SrAT. ANN. § 82-3803 (Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322
(1981 & Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.084 (1983).
142. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to .905 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
143. In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983). These guidelines
include: (1) a unanimous concurrence of at least three physicians, including the
attending physician, that the patient's condition is incurable; (2) court appointment
of a guardian, including appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the
interests of the incompetent patient; (3) withdrawal of the life-sustaining medical
treatment if in the guardian's best judgment the incompetent would have done so
if competent; and (4) if required, "a court determination of the rights and wishes
of the incompetent, with a guardian ad litem appointed to represent the incompetent
patient and to present all relevant facts to court." Id. at 137, 660 P.2d at 751.
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While the judiciary has the power and authority to decide such
issues, our decisions are limited by the facts before us. As these
issues necessarily involve society's moral standards as well as legal
and medical issues, the Legislature is the body most capable of
assessing the views of the people of this state.'14
2. Recent Statutes
Since 1980, twenty-five additional states and the District of Columbia
have enacted "living will" laws. 141 Most of the recent legislation has
focused on some of the ambiguities of the earlier statutes and their
failure to make statutory provisions for the situation in which a
terminally ill incompetent patient does not have a living will. 146 Five
of these recent statutes include provisions which allow patients to
choose a proxy appointment. 47 Three other recent statutes provide
procedures for decision-making on behalf of comatose patients who
have not executed advance written declarations.' 41 It is also significant
144. Id. at 139, 660 P.2d at 752.
145. Alabama enacted its statute in 1981. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984).
Delaware, Vermont and the District of Columbia enacted their statutes in 1982.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2508 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -
2430 (Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262, tit. 13, § 1801 (Supp.
1984-1985). Illinois and Virginia enacted their statutes in 1983. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110 1/2, §§ 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); VA. CODE §§ 54-325.8:1
to :13 (Supp. 1984)..Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, West Virginia, Wis-
consin and Wyoming enacted their statutes in 1984. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-
.15 (Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10 (West Supp. 1985); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101
to -121 (Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West Supp. 1984-1985); Wyo. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -152(Supp. 1984). Thirteen of the twenty-five states recently enacted their statutes in 1985.
See Otten, supra note 15.
146. For a discussion of these statutes and their differences, see supra notes 84-
144 and accompanying text. For an analysis of these new laws, see infra notes
147-78 and accompanying text. See also RIGHT TO DIE HANDBOOK, supra note 18,
at 12-28 (discussing all new laws from 1981-1984).
147. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2502(b)-(c) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.05(2)
(Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.3(c)(1) (West Supp. 1985); VA.
CODE § 54-325.8:4 (Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 33-26-145(d) (Supp. 1984). These
provisions allow an adult person to appoint by written declaration an agent who
will make medical decisions for the patient if he becomes incapable of doing so.
For a further discussion of the Delaware statute, see infra notes 151-55 and
accompanying text.
148. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.07 (Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5
(West Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 54-325.8:6 (Supp. 1984). For a further discussion
of the Virginia statute, see infra notes 156-67 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of statutes enacted prior to 1980 which have a provision dealing with incompetent
patients who have no directive, see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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that none of the new laws enacted contain the California, Texas,
and Idaho natural death acts' major restriction that a directive is
legally effective only if executed after the diagnosis of a terminal
illness.' 49 Five of the new laws also contain a provision that excludes
the administration of nourishment/sustenance (artificial or tube-feed-
ing) along with other procedures from the statute's definition of
life-sustaining procedures that can be terminated. 150
In July, 1982, the Delaware Death with Dignity Act 5' advanced
a new approach to address the liability of medical professionals who
withhold or withdraw life-saving treatment from dying patients. The
Delaware statute provides for the prior appointment by the patient
of an agent to act on his behalf in the event that, in the attending
physician's judgment, he becomes imcompetent 5 2 The agent is au-
thorized to accept or reject life-sustaining medical treatment on behalf
of the patient if the patient is subsequently declared incapable of
making that decision.' Thus, the Delaware statute offers two kinds
of decision-making procedures for the withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment from terminally ill patients: (1) a binding
directive from a competent patient; 1 and (2) the appointment of
149. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
restriction.
150. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(3) (Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(5)
(Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 702(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-
1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(5) (West Supp. 1984-1985); Wvo. STAT. § 33-
26-144(a)(iii) (Supp. 1984).
151. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2508 (1983).
152. Id. § 2502(b) (1983). The statute provides:
An adult person by written declaration may appoint an agent who will
act on behalf of such appointor if, due to a condition resulting from
illness or injury and, in the judgment of the attending physician, the
appointor becomes incapable of making a decision in the exercise of the
right to accept or refuse medical treatment.
Id.
153. Id. § 2502(c) (1983). The statute provides in relevant part:
An agent appointed in accordance with this section may accept or refuse
medical treatment proposed for the appointor if, in the judgment of the
attending physician, the appointor is incapable of making that decision.
This authority shall include the right to refuse medical treatment which
would extend the appointor's life.
Id.
154. Id. § 2502(a) (1983). Like the other statutes, the declaration must be in
writing, signed by the declarant, and witnessed by two or more adults. Id § 2503
(1983). However, the Delaware statute, unlike most of the "living will" laws, does
not contain a standard form directive. See id. §§ 2501-2508 (1983).
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a proxy to make treatment decisions for a patient who becomes
incompetent.'
The Virginia Natural Death Act'56 has been referred to as "one
of the best living will laws to be enacted" ' primarily because it
makes available three possible decision-making procedures in the
withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining medical treatment from
a terminally ill adult. l5 The Virginia statute permits the termination
of such treatment in situations: (1) where a competent adult makes
a written or oral declaration instructing his physician to withhold
or withdraw life-prolonging procedures in the event of a terminal
condition; 15 9 (2) where a competent adult makes an advance des-
ignation appointing a proxy to accept or refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment if he becomes unable to make such a decision and is
diagnosed as suffering from a terminal condition; 60 and (3) where
individuals designated by the statute, in a strict order of priority,
decide to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for an incompetent
terminally ill patient who has not executed an advance directive. 6'
The individuals involved, in order of priority, include: (1) a judicially
appointed guardian or committee of the patient if one exists; (2)
the patient's designated proxy; (3) the patient's spouse; (4) the
patient's adult child or children; (5) the parents of the patient; or
(6) the patient's nearest living relative. 162 If the decision to withdraw
or withhold treatment is to be made by a person in category three,
four, five or six, the consent of at least two such individuals is
necessary, provided that they are reasonably available. 163
155. Id. § 2502(b)-(c) (1983). Four other states provide for a similar proxy
appointment. See supra note 147 for the citations to these provisions.
156. VA. CODE §§ 54-325.8:1 to :13 (Supp. 1984).
157. RIGHT To DIE HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 23.
158. Id.; see VA. CODE § 54-325.8:1 to :13 (Supp. 1984).
159. VA. CODE § 54-325.8:3 (Supp. 1984). The statute provides in relevant part:
A written declaration shall be signed by the declarant in the presence
of two subscribing witnesses. An oral declaration may be made by a
competent adult in the presence of a physician and two witnesses by any
nonwritten means of communication at any time subsequent to the di-
agnosis of a terminal condition.
Id.
160. Id. § 54-325.8:4 (Supp. 1984). A competent adult has the right to "designate
another to make the treatment decision for him, in the event such person is
diagnosed as suffering from a terminal condition." Id. § 54-325.8:1 (Supp. 1984).
161. Id. § 54-325.8:6 (Supp. 1984).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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The Virginia statute does not contain any of the major restrictions
found in the California statute. First, the declaration remains effective
until revoked.' 64 Second, the Virginia statute does not make the
written directive binding only if executed after a terminal illness
diagnosis. 165 As the "product of an extensive study of the rights of
the terminally ill by a joint subcommittee composed of senators,
delegates, physicians, attorneys, and clergy, ' 166 the Virginia statute
is clearly the most comprehensive "living will" statute enacted thus
far. 167
Like the Virginia Natural Death Act, the Florida Life-Prolonging
Procedure Act 16 and the Louisiana Life-Sustaining Procedures Act,
169
both enacted in 1984, provide for proxy appointments 170 and priority
systems for decisions involving an incompetent patient' 71 in addition
to a written or oral declaration by a competent adult. 172 The Wyoming
Act, like the Delaware law, 173 provides only for a proxy appointment
74
and a written declaration by a competent adult. 175 Only two of the
recent statutes, the Georgia Living Wills Act and the Wisconsin
Natural Death Act, restrict the effectiveness of the declaration to
a specific number of years.176 Each of the other new statutes provides
for the directive to remain in effect until revoked. 177 Finally, the
164. See id. § 54-325.8:5 (Supp. 1984). California's statute provides for an effective
period of only five years. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
165. See VA CODE §§ 54-325.8:1 to :13 (Supp. 1984). The oral directive, however,
must be made after a terminal illness diagnosis. Id. § 54-325.8:3 (Supp. 1984). In
California, the patient can not execute a directive until fourteen days after the
diagnosis of a terminal illness. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
166. RIGHT TO DIE HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 23.
167. See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
168. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-.15 (Supp. 1985).
169. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10 (West Supp. 1985).
170. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.05(2) (Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.58.3(C)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
171. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.07 (Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5
(West Supp. 1985).
172. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.04(1) (Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.3
(West Supp. 1985).
173. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Delaware statute.
174. The statute includes the option of appointing a proxy to make treatment
decisions if the patient becomes comatose or otherwise incapable of doing so. Wyo.
STAT. § 33-26-145(d) (Supp. 1984).
175. Id. § 33-26-145 (Supp. 1984).
176. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-6 (Supp. 1984) (effective for seven years); WIs.
STAT. § 154.b3(1) (West Supp. 1984-1985) (effective for five years).
177. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-
2508 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
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Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Wisconsin and Wyoming statutes specif-
ically exclude nourishment/sustenance procedures along with pro-
cedures that provide comfort or alleviate pain from the definition
of life-sustaining medical treatment that can be withdrawn from
terminally ill patients. '
IV. Development of the "Right to Die" in New York State
A. Eichner v. Dillon
In 1981, the New York State Court of Appeals held, in Eichner
v. Dillon, 79 that a respirator could be withdrawn from an incom-
petent dying patient when there was no reasonable chance of recovery
and there was "clear and convincing" evidence that the patient
would have decided not to continue treatment if he were competent. 80
The court did not consider the wishes of family members, doctors,
or an ethics committee regarding the withdrawal of the life-sustaining
treatment, as the New Jersey Supreme Court had in Quinlan, 's
though it implicitly provided judicial support for living wills. 182
The patient in Eichner was an eighty-three-year-old man who was
placed on a respirator after lapsing into a permanent coma.'83 The
local director of the religious society to which the comatose patient
belonged 84 requested that the hospital remove the respirator." 5 The
§§ 765.01-.15 (Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, §§ 701-710 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1984-1985); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10 (West Supp. 1985);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§
5251-5262 (Supp. 1984-1985); VA. CODE §§ 54-325.8:1 to :13 (Supp. 1984); W. VA.
CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -152 (Supp.
1984).
178. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.03(3) (Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(5)
(Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 702(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-
1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(5) (West Supp. 1984-1985); WYo. STAT. § 33-
26-144(a)(iii) (Supp. 1984).
179. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S.
858 (1981).
180. Id. at 378-79, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
181. For a discussion of Quinlan, see supra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
182. See 52 N.Y.2d at 378-380, 420 N.E.2d at 71-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
183. Id. at 370-71, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269. The patient, Brother
Joseph Fox, lapsed into a coma when he suffered cardiac arrest during an operation
in 1979. Id.
184. Brother Fox was a member of the Society of Mary, a Roman Catholic
religious order in Mineola, New York. Id.
185. Id. Father Phillip Eichner made this request after the attending physicians
had informed him that "there was no reasonable chance of recovery and that
Brother Fox would die in [a coma]." Id.
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hospital refused to withdraw this life-saving treatment without court
authorization. 8 6 The director thereupon petitioned to be appointed
committee of the person and property of the patient with authority
to order removal of the respirator. 187
The supreme court ordered that the director be appointed as the
committee of the person and property of the comatose patient and
authorized him to order the respirator removed.' 88 The trial judge
based his decision on the patient's common law right to bodily self-
determination, which in part consisted of the right to decline life-
sustaining medical treatment.8 9 The trial judge also relied on evidence
of the patient's prior opposition to the use of a respirator in sus-
taining his life. In particular, the judge stressed that before the
operation the patient had repeatedly discussed with members of his
religious society his desire that extraordinary medical treatment not
be used to keep him alive. 90
The appellate division unanimously affirmed, but it went beyond
the trial court's decision and recognized a patient's right to die with
dignity.' 9' The court found that this right of a terminally ill patient
to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment "rest[ed] on a far more
fundamental principle of law: the constitutional right to privacy."' 192
186. Id.
187. Id. Father Eichner had applied to the Supreme Court, Nassau County,
pursuant to article 78 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law. Id.
188. In re Eichner, 102 Misc. 2d 184, 423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1979). The court stated that termination of the life-support systems would not
"give rise to either civil or criminal liability on the part of any participant .... .
Id. at 213, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 599. The authorization to withdraw the life-sustaining
equipment, however, was confined to the respirator only. Id. at 213-14, 423 N.Y.S.2d
at 599.
189. Id. at 196-203, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 589-93. The trial judge also found that
this right was not outweighed by the state's interest in protecting life or in affording
the medical profession a chance to carry out its functions. Id. at 203-04, 423
N.Y.S.2d at 593-94. See Byrn, supra note 11, at 16-35 for a discussion of these
state interests.
190. 102 Misc. 2d at 192-93, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 586-87. During these meetings,
"Brother Fox not only repeatedly expressed agreement with the [Roman Catholic
C]hurch's teaching on the subject of the withdrawal of extraordinary life-support
systems but also stated that he personally would not want any of this 'extraordinary
business' done for him under such circumstances." Id. at 192, 423 N.Y.S.2d at
586. In 1957, Pope Pius XII concluded in a well-known allocution to a group of
anaesthesiologists "that it was morally and spiritually proper for adherents of the
Roman Catholic Church to direct that use of extraordinary life-support systems be
terminated when there is no longer reasonable hope of recovery." Id.
191. Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 454-62, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 536-41 (2d
Dep't 1980).
192. Id. at 457, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 537 (footnote omitted). For a general discussion
of the right to privacy, see supra, note 12 and accompanying text.
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The appellate court also listed specific procedures to be followed
by doctors and hospitals in determining whether to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment from incompetent ter-
minally ill patients. 93 These procedures included four requirements:
(1) the attending physicians must certify that the patient is terminally
ill; (2) this prognosis must be confirmed by a hospital committee
of at least three doctors with specialties relevant to the patient's
case; (3) upon confirmation, a guardian ad litem must be appointed
to protect the patient's rights; and (4) the attorney-general and the
appropriate district attorney must be notified, though their approval
is not required. 94 The court concluded by stating that "[w]here this
procedure is complied with, and where the court concludes .
that the extraordinary life-sustaining measures should be discontin-
ued, no participant-either medical or lay-shall be subject to crim-
inal or civil liability as a result of the termination of such life-
sustaining measures." 195
In March, 1981, the New York State Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court's decision to allow removal of the respirator 96 but
chose not to decide the petitioner's right to privacy argument "be-
cause the relief granted to the petitioner ... [was] adequately sup-
ported by common-law principles.' ' 97 The court based its decision
on the patient's common law right of bodily self-determination s9
and the "clear and convincing" proof of this patient's prior expres-
sions of his desire not to be kept alive by extraordinary means. 99
The court of appeals also rejected the elaborate judicial procedures
193. Id. at 476-77, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
194. Id. Individuals who may initiate proceedings on the patient's behalf include
"a member of the patient's family, someone having a close personal relationship
with [the patient], or an official of the hospital ...... I d. at 476, 426 N.Y.S.2d
at 550.
195. Id. at 477, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
196. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 383, 420 N.E.2d 64, 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 276 (1981).
197. Id. at 377, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273. This is a question
which the Supreme Court has also declined to consider. See, e.g., Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (denying certiorari to Karen Ann Quinlan case).
198. 52 N.Y.2d at 377, 420 N.E.2d at 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273. Common law
rights are not as closely protected as constitutional rights when balanced against
strong state interests. See generally Note, Live or Let Die: Who Decides an
Incompetent's Fate? In re Storar and In re Eichner, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 387,
390-92 (1982) (defending court's choice of common law right to refuse treatment
over constitutional right to privacy); Note, In re Storar: The Right to Die and
Incompetent Patients, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 1087, 1097 (1982) (common law and
constitutional rights are quite different in extent of judicial protection).
199. 52 N.Y.2d at 378-80, 420 N.E.2d at 71-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274; see supra
note 90 and accompanying text.
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detailed by the appellate division 200 for cases involving incompetent
patients. 20 1 Judge Wachtler, writing for the majority, stated that the
reason for rejecting these guidelines was that "[u]nlike the Legis-
lature, the courts are neither equipped nor empowered to prescribe
substantive or procedural rules for all, most, or even the more
common contingencies. Our role, especially in matters as sensitive
as these, is limited to resolving the issues raised by facts presented
in particular cases." 02 By rejecting the standards developed by the
appellate division, the court of appeals refused to create a judicial
precedent as powerful as that established by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Quinlan.203
B. In re Storar
In a companion case to Eichner, the court of appeals, in In re
Storar,204 ruled that the "clear and convincing" standard of proof
of a patient's wishes, described in Eichner had not been satisfied
25
in the case of a fifty-two-year-old incompetent, terminally ill pa-
tient. 206 The patient's mother had requested that the blood trans-
fusions for her son be discontinued 20 7 so that the remainder of his
life would not be full of pain and suffering. The director of the
development center then brought a declaratory suit seeking authority
to continue the transfusions, claiming that death would result without
them. 208
200. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
procedures.
201. 52 N.Y.2d at 370, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
202. Id. (footnote omitted). Judge Jones dissented as to the companion case of
In re Storar. Id. at 383-91, 420 N.E.2d at 74-79, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276-81. For a
discussion of this case, see infra notes 204-17 and accompanying text. Judge
Fuchsberg also dissented and would have dismissed both cases as moot since both
patients subsequently had died. 52 N.Y.2d at 391-93, 420 N.E.2d at 79, 438 N.Y.S.2d
at 281.
203. For a discussion of the Quinlan decision, see supra notes 20-37 and ac-
companying text.
204. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981).
205. 52 N.Y.2d at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72-73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75.
206. The patient, John Storar, was retarded and also had cancer of the bladder.
Id. at 373, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
207. Id. at 373, 420 N.E.2d at 69, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 271. The patient's physician
had "diagnosed the cancer as terminal, concluding that after using all medical and
surgical means then available, the patient would nevertheless die from the disease."
Id.
208. Id. at 373-74, 420 N.E.2d at 69, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 271. Mrs. Storar then
cross-petitioned for a court order prohibiting the blood transfusions. Id. at 374,
420 N.E.2d at 69, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
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The trial court decided that the transfusions could be discontinued
based on the patient's right to bodily self-determination. °9 Since the
patient was incompetent, the court agreed with the opinion of the
patient's mother that her son's best interests would be served by.
terminating the blood transfusions.2 10 The court also emphasized that
the transfusions would not cure the patient's disease, that they caused
a great deal of pain, and that the patient had submitted to the
transfusions with reluctance." ' The appellate division affirmed the
lower court's decision in a memorandum opinion. 212
The New York State Court of Appeals reversed and held that the
transfusions had to be continued based on the Eichner decision. 213
The court, structuring an analogy between the role of the state in
protecting this patient and its interest in protecting the health and
welfare of a child,2 14 ruled that the mother's decision to discontinue
the blood transfusions to her son must yield to the state's interest
in protecting the life of her son.2 15 The court also noted that the
state interest predominated in this patient's case because, unlike the
comatose patient in Eichner, the retarded patient had never been
competent in his lifetime and had never been able to make a decision
concerning his medical treatment or voice his opposition to life-
sustaining treatment. 21 6 Thus, the court, in part, rejected the sub-
stituted judgment approach adopted by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Saikewicz.21 7
209. In re Storar, 106 Misc. 2d 880, 885-86, 433 N.Y.S.2d 388, 393 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1980).
210. Id. at 886, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
211. Id. at 883-84, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 392-93.
212. In re Storar, 78 A.D.2d 1013, 434 N.Y.S.2d 46 (4th Dep't 1980). The
appellate division used the same reasoning as the trial court to reach the same
conclusion. Id. at 1013, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
213. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 383, 420 N.E.2d 64, 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 276 (1981).
214. Id. at 380-81, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275. For legal purposes
the patient, John Storar, was deemed a child with a mental capacity of eighteen
months. Id. at 373, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270. The legal construction
of the state's role as surrogate parent is known as the doctrine of parens patriae.
Id. at 380-81, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275. For a discussion of the
state's interest in protecting incompetent patients, see Byrn, supra note 11, at 24-
28.
215. 52 N.Y.2d at 380-81, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
216. Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72-73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75.
217. Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275. "[Ilt is unrealistic to
attempt to determine whether he would want to continue potentially life prolonging
treatment if he were competent." Id. For a discussion of the Saikewicz decision
and its use of the substituted judgment approach, see supra notes 40-49 and
accompanying text.
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New York courts require "clear and convincing" evidence in
situations where it is claimed that an incompetent patient would
have desired to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment if he
became terminally ill.218 In effect, the high court's decisions in Eichner
and Storar "affirmed that even in the absence of a living will law
in the state, New York residents' living will declarations carry legal
weight as evidence of their preferences about terminal treatment." 219
However, the court's refusal to adopt standards and guidelines leaves
situations in which incompetent patients do not have living wills or
in which the family or guardian is unable to show prior intent
without solutions. Also, doctors and hospitals continue to suffer
uncertainty in their decisions to remove life-sustaining treatment even
where the patient has stated his intentions since a living will without
statutory authorization is not conclusive proof of a patient's pref-
erences.
C. Recent Developments in New York
Currently, New York has no "living will" statute. On September
17, 1984, the New York State Health Commissioner, Dr. David
Axelrod, announced that he was drafting proposals for new legislation
that would allow hospitals and doctors to withhold life-saving medical
treatment from terminally ill and dying patients fully immune from
civil and criminal prosecution. 210 In October, 1984, Governor Mario
Cuomo announced his intention to establish a task force on "life
and the law" to recommend legislation on such issues as the "right
to die."' 22' In December, the Governor appointed twenty-three people
to this task force and named Dr. Axelrod as the chairman. 222
Doctors and hospitals in New York state have voluntarily followed
the Medical Society of New York (Society) guidelines issued on
218. Id. at 378-80, 420 N.E.2d at 71-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274; see also In re
Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 116 Misc. 2d 477, 487-88, 455 N.Y.S.2d 706, 712-13 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1982) (decision to terminate life-prolonging procedures would
be honored where there is evidence that patient had made rational decision to
forego such treatment before becoming comatose).
219. RIGHT TO DIE HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 10.
220. Sullivan, supra note 4, at Al, col. 1.
221. Oreskes, supra note 1, at Al, col. 1. Another important issue that will be
considered is the legal rights of embryos formed outside the womb. Id.
222. Severo, supra note 2, at A22, col. -1. A report is due from the panel by
May 1, 1985.
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September 20, 1982.223 These guidelines involve "instructions some-
times given hospital staffs to withhold cardiopulmonary resuscitation
from terminally ill patients in the event they suffer acute cardiac
or respiratory arrest. '2 24 These instructions, known as "Do Not
Resuscitate" (DNR) orders, are defined in the guidelines. 225 The
Society's guidelines state four requirements for a medically appro-
priate DNR decision: (1) the DNR decision must be "written as a
formal order by the attending physician; ' 226 (2) the facts and con-
siderations involved in reaching a DNR decision must be entered in
the patient's medical record; (3) the attending physician is responsible
for making certain that the DNR order is discussed with the ap-
propriate hospital staff members; and (4) the "DNR order shall be
subject to review at any time by all concerned parties on a regular
basis and may be rescinded at any time. '227
One concern of the Society in implementing its guidelines is how
the decision to issue a DNR order -is reached. The guidelines require
the decision to be made jointly by the doctor and the terminally ill
patient, or the doctor and the patient's family if the patient is unable
to make his own decision due to incompetence. 2 a The guidelines
also provide that "[i]f a patient disagrees, or, in the case of a
patient incapable of making an appropriate decision, the family
member(s) disagree, a DNR order should not be written. 2 29
Although these procedures provide guidance for the withholding
of cardiopulmonary resuscitation, doctors and hospitals still fear the
legal consequences of their decisions in these emergency treatment
situations. 20 The guidelines evidence the medical profession's concern
223. Sullivan, supra note 4, at Al, col. 1; see Medical Society of the State of
New York, News Release (Sept. 20, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Medical Society
Guidelines]. The Society is a "federation of 61 county medical societies in New
York representing some 27,000 physicians in the state." Medical Society Guidelines,
supra at 1. Since these procedures are only guidelines, it is impossible to determine
with any certainty how many doctors and hospitals actually follow them.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 3. "DNR . . . means that, in the event of a cardiac or respiratory
arrest, cardiopulmonary resuscitative measures will not be initiated or carried out."
Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at D14, col. 1. In March, 1984, a Queens
County grand jury investigated two cases at La Guardia Hospital in which resus-
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in withholding life-saving medical treatment, yet they fail to address
two major problems. First, they do not specify what to do if the
patient is incompetent and has no family."' Second, the guidelines
do not define doctor-hospital liability for withholding other life-
saving procedures such as respiratory support and artificial feeding
from terminally ill and dying patients. The best and only possible
resolution of this controversy lies with the New York State Legis-
lature's enactment of a comprehensive "living will" statute.232 In
the words of one court:
Because the issue with all its ramifications is fraught with com-
plexity and encompasses the interests of the law, both civil and
criminal, medical ethics and social morality, it is not one which
is well-suited for resolution in an adversary judicial proceeding.
It is the type [sic] issue which is more suitably addressed in the
legislative forum, where fact finding can be less confined and the
viewpoints of all interested institutions and disciplines can be
presented and synthesized. 233
V. Recommendations for a New York Natural Death Act
In 1981, the New York State Court of Appeals, in In re Storar,234
remarked: "[i]f it is desirable to enlarge the role of the courts in
cases involving discontinuance of life sustaining treatment for in-
competents by establishing . . . a mandatory procedure of successive
approvals by physicians, hospital personnel, relatives and the courts,
the change should come from the Legislature." '235 The legislature
should enact a natural death act setting the necessary procedures to
be followed by physicians and hospitals in withholding or with-
drawing life-sustaining medical treatment from terminally ill and
dying patients.23 6 The legislature should examine closely the "right
citation was withheld from two elderly, terminally ill patients. Although the grand
jury did not issue any indictments, it did urge the state to establish procedures
for withholding medical care from terminally ill patients. Id.
231. See Medical Society Guidelines, supra note 223, at 3.
232. For a discussion of proposals and recommendations for a New York Natural
Death Act, see infra notes 234-77 and accompanying text.
233. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980). For a discussion of
this case, see supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
234. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
235. Id. at 382-83, 420.N.E.2d at 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276; see supra notes 179-
219 and accompanying text.
236. See Living, Dying, and the Law, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1984, at A30, col.
1 (editorial).
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to die" cases and "living will" statutes of other states to avoid the
ambiguities and failures of prior laws. 217
A. Recent Legislative Proposals
"Living will" bills recently have been introduced in several states, 238
including New York 239 and New Jersey. 240 The New Jersey bill in-
troduced on November 19, 1984, by Senators Matthew Feldman and
Wayne Dumont recognized the right of the individual to "execute
an oral or written declaration instructing an attending physician to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures in the event that
the person is diagnosed and certified as suffering from a terminal
condition." ' 24' The bill also granted immunity from civil and criminal
liability to all medical or health care professionals who comply with
the act. 2 This immunity is inapplicable, however, if "it is shown
by a preponderance of the evidence that the person authorizing or
effectuating the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining pro-
cedures was negligent or did not in good faith comply with the
provisions of this act. '243
Under this bill, the declaration remained effective until revoca-
tion. 244 Also provided was a standard living will form which must
237. For a discussion of the "right to die" cases of other states, see supra notes
20-83 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the New York cases, see supra
notes 179-219 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the "living will" statutes,
see supra notes 84-178 and accompanying text.
238. The eighteen states which have considered such proposals in 1984 are: Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, and Utah. RIGHT TO DIE HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 2.
239. S.B. 7697, 207th Leg., Reg. Sess. (New York Feb. 14, 1984) [hereinafter
cited as New York Bill]; see also A.B. 8008, 206th Leg., Reg. Sess. (New York
Jun. 6, 1983); S.B. 2401, 206th Leg., Reg. Sess. (New York Feb. 8, 1983); A.B.
1948, 206th Leg., Reg. Sess. (New York Jan. 20, 1983).
240. S.B. 2387, 201st Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (New Jersey Nov. 19, 1984) [hereinafter
cited as New Jersey Bill].
241. New Jersey Bill § 2. The oral declaration "may be made by a person at
any time subsequent to the diagnosis of a terminal condition in the presence of
a physician and two witnesses." Id. § 4(b).
242. Id. § 9(a).
243. Id. -§ 9(b). This bill, like the Texas statute, explicitly makes negligence an
exception to the immunity provision. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Texas statute.
244. Id. § 4(e). "Unless revoked, a declaration is effective and binding from
the date of execution." Id. Four existing statutes make the directive effective for
a specific number of years. The states that have such provisions in their "living
will" statutes are California, Georgia, Idaho and Wisconsin. See supra notes 94,
140 & 176 and accompanying text.
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be substantially followed by a patient in order to be enforceable. 245
Unlike the California, Texas and Idaho natural death acts, the bill
did not require a terminal illness determination before execution of
a written directive 2 46 although it did require such a prognosis for
an oral directive to be effective. 247 The bill also provided for in-
validation of the directive if the declarant were pregnant at the time
of exercise. 241
Like the Virginia priority procedure1 49 the New Jersey bill provided
a procedure for the withdrawal of medical treatment from a ter-
minally ill, incompetent patient who had not executed an advance
declaration. 20 The bill, however, did not provide for the possibility
of a proxy appointment executed by the patient before he became
incompetent or comatose. 25' While the bill did not specify whether
artificial feeding was a "life-sustaining procedure, ' ' 25 2 the New Jersey
Supreme Court recently held that artificial feeding is the kind of
life-sustaining medical treatment that could be withdrawn from ter-
minally ill patients.253
The New York bill introduced by Senator Andrew Jenkins on
February 14, 1984, recognized "the right of an adult person to make
a written directive instructing his physician to withhold or withdraw
life-sustaining procedures in the event of a terminal condition.
25 4
The bill also allows doctors and hospitals to act on such directives,
fully immune from civil and criminal liability. 25 The Jenkins' bill
contains two restrictive provisions, however, which originated in the
California law: (1) the directive can not be executed until fourteen
days after a terminal illness diagnosis; 25 6 and (2) the directive is only
245. New Jersey Bill § 5. Fifteen of the "living will" statutes have a standard
form directive (or living will) which must be substantially followed. See supra note
120 and accompanying text.
246. See New Jersey Bill §§ 1-21.
247. Id. § 4(b).
248. Id. § 4(f).
249. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
priority procedure in the Virginia statute.
250. New Jersey Bill 2387 § 18.
251. See id. §§ 1-21. Delaware was the first state to utilize this proxy system.
See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of this provision
in the Delaware statute.
252. See New Jersey Bill § 3(c).
253. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). For a discussion of the
court's decision in In re Conroy, see supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
254., New York Bill § 4600.
255. Id. § 4605.
256. Id. § 4606(2). See supra note 97 and accompanying text for a discussion
of this provision in the California statute.
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effective for five years. 2 7 Both of these provisions are counter-
productive to the purposes of a natural death act since they fail to
recognize the potential for a sudden coma and do not accept the
logical presumption that a person would revoke a living will if his
feelings changed subsequent to the initial execution. 218
The New York proposed bill fails to address many of the major
problems in the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment from
terminally ill patients. Unlike the New Jersey bill, 259 the Jenkins'
bill does not provide for an oral directive, and it does not establish
procedures for terminally ill, incompetent patients who have not
executed a directive, 260 thus continuing the "clear and convincing"
evidence standard enunciated in Storar.26' Finally, the bill does not
provide for proxy appointments262 and it does not mention whether
artificial or tube feeding is a life-sustaining procedure. 26 The current
New York case law also fails to adequately provide for proxy
appointments and does not determine whether tube feeding is a life-
sustaining procedure. 264
B. Proposal for Natural Death Act
Using the Virginia "living will" statute as a model, 265 the New
York State Legislature should enact a natural death act which con-
siders five important areas. First, the statute must grant immunity
from civil and criminal liability to all health professionals who
withhold treatment in "good faith" compliance with the statute.
This "good faith" standard would better relieve doctors and hospitals
of the fear of legal consequences for withholding such treatment
than would a negligence standard.266
257. New York Bill § 4604. See supra note 94 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this provision in the California statute.
258. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
259. New Jersey Bill §§ 1-21.
260. See New York Bill §§ 4601-4608.
261. For a discussion of In re Storar and its companion case, Eichner v. Dillon,
see supra notes 179-219 and accompanying text.
262. See New York Bill §§ 4601-4608.
263. See id. § 4601(3). See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this problem in the Conroy decision.
264. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
265. For a discussion of the Virginia statute, see supra notes 156-67 and ac-
companying text.
266. The Texas statute makes use of a negligence standard. See supra note 125
and accompanying text.
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Second, the statute must provide for a written267 or oral2 6 directive
by a competent adult to withdraw life-sustaining treatment if he
enters a terminal condition. Adult individuals have the fundamental
right to control decisions relating to their own medical care, including
the choice to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining procedures. 269
Third, the statute must permit a patient to make an advance
declaration appointing a proxy to refuse or accept life-sustaining
medical treatment for the patient if the patient becomes incompe-
tent. 27° This provision would allow the patient to designate another
to exercise his right to make decisions concerning his own medical
treatment.
Fourth, the statute must further provide for specific procedures
to be followed in deciding who could refuse or accept life-sustaining
treatment for the patient when he is comatose or incompetent and
no advance declaration has been executed.27" ' Most of the judicial
decisions in this area have stated that their respective legislatures
should establish guidelines on the withdrawal of life-sustaining pro-
cedures from terminally ill, incompetent patients with no directives. 272
Finally, the legislature must determine whether all forms of life-
sustaining treatment, including artificial feeding, could come under
the statute's definition of "life-sustaining treatment. 2 73 Arguably,
artificial feeding should be included because "the primary focus
should be on the patient's desires and experience of pain and en-
joyment-not the type of treatment involved. ' '274
267. In the case of a written directive, a form declaration must be followed
substantially. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
268. The oral declaration must be made by a competent adult in the presence
of the attending physician and two other witnesses.
269. For a discussion of the right to privacy, see supra note 12 and accompanying
text.
270. Only five states currently have this provision. They are: Delaware, Florida,
Louisiana, Virginia and Wyoming. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
271. Only seven states have a provision dealing with this issue. They are: Arkansas,
Florida, Louisiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon and Virginia. See supra
note 131 and accompanying text. Two states recently were advised of the lack of
such a provision in their statutes. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court of California,
147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983) (noting that there are no
established guidelines in living will statute for this situation); In re Colyer, 99
Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) (court established its own guidelines to deal
with incompetent patient).
272. See supra notes 38-83, 179-219 and accompanying text for a discussion of
these cases.
273. The New Jersey Supreme Court recently held that artificial feeding could
be withheld from a terminally ill patient. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying
text for a discussion of In re Conroy.
274. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 369, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233 (1985).
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The legislature should not include the two restrictive provisions
found in some of the statutes.2" First, the directive should remain
effective until revoked to relieve the patient of the burden of reex-
ecuting the directive every time the effective period expires. 276 Second,
the statute should not require that the directive only be effective if
executed after a terminal illness diagnosis, whether the waiting period
is one day or fourteen days. 2 7 Such provisions fail to recognize the
possible situations where a patient is brought into a hospital in a
comatose state before being diagnosed as terminally ill. The issue
is not the diagnosis of a terminal illness, but the individual's right
to terminate life-sustaining medical treatment.
VI. Conclusion
Specific guidelines must be enacted by the New York State Leg-
islature to enable doctors, patients, and families to confront with
legal certainty the question of when life-sustaining medical treatment
can be withheld or withdrawn from terminally ill patients. Such a
statute must protect the conflicting interests of the state, the patient
and health professionals. 278 As several state judiciaries have noted,
the legislature should solve this difficult problem because such guide-
lines cannot be formulated without serious debate and discussion. 279
Special attention also should be given to existing "living will" statutes
and their ambiguities. 210 If drafted pursuant to the proposal presented
in the following appendix, a comprehensive New York Natural Death
Act would allow a terminally ill patient to die with dignity and
allow a doctor to remove life-sustaining treatment from a terminally
ill patient without fear of civil and criminal liability.
Edward M. Joyce
275. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
provisions in the California statute.
276. For a discussion of a provision in the California, Georgia, Idaho, and
Wisconsin statutes which limits the effective period of a written directive, see supra
notes 110-11, 176-77 and accompanying text.
277. For a discussion of this terminal illness diagnosis provision, see supra notes
109-11, 149 and accompanying text.
278. For a discussion of these competing interests, see supra notes 11-13 and
accompanying text.
279. For a discussion of the "right to die" cases, see supra notes 20-83 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the New York cases, see supra notes 179-
219 and accompanying text.
280. For a discussion of these statutes, see supra notes 84-178 and accompanying
text.
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Appendix
New York Natural Death Act
Section 1. Policy statement. The Legislature finds that every com-
petent adult has the fundamental right to control the decisions relating
to his own medical care, . . . [including the decision to withhold
or withdraw medical treatment or procedures designed] to prolong
his life. [The Legislature further finds that tihis right is subject to
certain interests of society, such as the protection of human life
and the preservation of ethical standards in the medical profes-
sion. . . . In order that the rights and intentions of a person with
[a terminal] condition may be respected even after he is no longer
able to participate actively in decisions concerning himself, and to
encourage communication among such patient, his family, and his
physician, the Legislature declares that the laws of [New York]
recognize the right of a competent adult to make an oral or written
declaration instructing his physician to provide, withhold, or with-
draw [life-sustaining] procedures, or to designate another to make
the treatment decision for him, in the event that such person should
be diagnosed as suffering from a terminal condition. 28'
Section 2. Definitions. For the purposes of this act, the term:
(1) "Attending physician" means the physician selected by, or
assigned to, the patient who has primary responsibility for the
treatment and care of the patient.
(2) "Declaration" means a witnessed document in writing [or a
witnessed oral statement], voluntarily executed by the declarant in
accordance with the requirements of [Section 3].
(3) "Life-sustaining procedure" means any medical procedure or
intervention, which, when applied to a qualified patient, would serve
only to prolong artificially the dying process and where, in the
judgment of the attending physician and a second physician, death
will occur whether or not such procedure or intervention is utilized.
[The term "life-sustaining procedure" includes, but is not limited
to, respiratory support, artificial feeding tubes and cardiopulmonary
resuscitation.] The term "life-sustaining procedure" shall not include
the administration of medication or the performance of any medical
procedure deemed necessary to provide comfort care or to alleviate
pain.
(4) "Physician" means a person authorized to practice medicine
in the [State of New York].
281. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.02 (Supp. 1985).
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(5) "Qualified patient" means a patient who has executed a dec-
laration in accordance with this [Act] and who has been diagnosed
and certified in writing to be afflicted with a terminal condition by
two physicians who have personally examined the patient, one of
whom shall be the attending physician.
(6) "Terminal condition" means an incurable condition caused by
injury, disease, or illness, which, regardless of the application of
life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable medical judg-
ment, produce death, and where the application of life-sustaining
procedures serve [sic] only to postpone the moment of death of the
patient."2'
(7) "Witness" means a person who is not a spouse or blood
relative of the patient.28
Section 3. Procedure for making a declaration; notice to physician.
Any competent adult may, at any time, make a written declaration
directing the withholding or withdrawal of [life-sustaining] procedures
in the event such person should develop a terminal condition. A
written declaration shall be signed by the declarant in the presence
of two subscribing witnesses. An oral declaration may be made by
a competent adult in the presence of a physician and two witnesses
by any nonwritten means of communication.
It shall be the responsibility of the declarant to provide for
notification to his attending physician that a declaration has been
made. In the event the declarant is comatose, incompetent or oth-
erwise mentally or physically incapable, any other person may notify
the physician of the existence of a declaration. An attending physician
who is so notified shall promptly make the declaration or a copy
of the declaration, if written, a part of the declarant's medical
records. If the declaration is oral, the physician shall likewise promptly
make the fact of such a declaration a part of the patient's medical
record. 28
4
Section 4. Suggested form of written declaration. A declaration
executed pursuant to this [Act] may, but need not, be in the following
form, and may include other specific directions including, but not
limited to, a designation of another person to make the treatment
decision for the declarant should he be (i) diagnosed as suffering
from a terminal condition and (ii) comatose, incompetent or otherwise
282. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2421 (Supp. 1984).
283. VA. CODE § 54-325.8:2 (Supp. 1984).
284. Id. § 54-325.8:3 (Supp. 1984).
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mentally or physically incapable of communication. Should any other
specific directions be held to be invalid, such invalidity shall not
affect the declaration.
Declaration made this day of (month, year).
I, , willfully and voluntarily make known my
desire that my dying shall not be artificially prolonged under the
circumstances set forth below, and do hereby declare:
If at any time I should have a terminal condition and my attending
physician has determined that there can be no recovery from such
condition and my death is imminent, where the application of life-
sustaining procedures would serve only to artificially prolong the
dying process, I direct that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn,
and that I be permitted to die naturally with only the administration
of medication or the performance of any medical procedure deemed
necessary to provide me with comfort care or to alleviate pain.
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use
of' such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention that this dec-
laration shall be honored by my family and physician as the final
expression of my legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment
and accept the consequences for such refusal.
I understand the full import of this declaration and I am emo-
tionally and mentally competent to make this directive.
[If I have been diagnosed as pregnant, this declaration shall have
no force and effect during the course of my pregnancy.]
Signed
The declarant is known to me and I believe him or her to be of
sound mind.
Witness
Witness 285
Section 5. Revocation of Declaration. A declaration may be re-
voked at any time by the declarant by (i) a signed, dated writing;
or (ii) physical cancellation or destruction of the declaration by the
declarant or another in his presence and at his direction; or (iii) an
oral expression of intent to revoke. Any such revocation shall be
effective when communicated to the attending physician. No civil
or criminal liability shall be imposed upon any person for a failure
to act upon a revocation unless that person has actual [notice] of
such revocation. 286
285. Id. § 54-325.8:4 (Supp. 1984).
286. Id. § 54-325.8:5 (Supp. 1984).
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Section 6. Procedure in absence of declaration. Nothing in this
[Act] shall be construed in any manner to prevent the witholding
or the withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from an adult patient
with a terminal condition who is comatose, incompetent, or otherwise
physically or mentally incapable of communication and has not made
a declaration in accordance with this [Act], provided there is an
agreement for the withholding or the withdrawal of life-sustaining
procedures between the attending physician and any of the following
individuals in the following order of priority if no individual in a
prior class is reasonably available, willing, and competent to act:
(1) The judicially appointed [guardian] of the patient if one has
been appointed. This subparagraph shall not be construed to require
such appointment in order that a treatment decision can be made
under this Section.
(2) The patient's spouse not judicially separated.
(3) An adult child of the patient.
(4) The parents of the patient.
(5) The patient's sibling.
(6) The patient's other ascendants or descendants....
In any case where the treatment decision is made by a person
specified in subparagraphs [(2), (3), (4), (5), or (6)] there shall be
at least two witnesses present at the time the treatment decision is
made. The absence of a declaration by an adult patient shall not
give rise to any presumption as to the intent to consent or to refuse
life-sustaining procedures. [This Section will not apply if there is
clear and convincing evidence of the patient's desires to accept or
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. If such evidence exists, it
alone will determine whether or not life-sustaining medical treatment
should be withheld or withdrawn.] 28 7
Section 7. Immunity from liability. No physician, licensed health
care professional, medical care facility or employee thereof who in
good faith and pursuant to reasonable medical standards causes or
participates in the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining pro-
cedures from a qualified patient pursuant to a declaration which
purports to have been made in accordance with this Act shall, as
a result thereof, be subject to criminal or civil liability or be found
to have committed an act of unprofessional conduct.2 8
Section 8. Suicide; mercy killing or euthanasia prohibited. The
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in accordance
287. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1299.58.5 (West Supp. 1985).
288. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 707 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984).
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with the provisions of [this Act] does not, for any purpose, constitute
a suicide.28 9 Nothing in [this Act] shall be construed to condone,
authorize, or approve mercy killing or euthanasia, or to permit any
affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end life other than to
permit the natural process of dying.2 90
289. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.11(2) (Supp. 1985).
290. Id. § 765.11(1) (Supp. 1985).
